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REVERSALS IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
PROCESS: EFFICACY OF STATE RATIFICATIONS OF THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
With the Equal Rights Amendment' nearing the number of ratifi-
cations required 2 for inclusion in the Constitution, both opponents and
proponents are intensifying pressure on state legislatures to reverse either
earlier ratificationlor.rejection. One state has already passed a resolution
rescinding ratification and others are known to be considering similar
resolutions.' Such state action presents important questions concerning
how the votes of rescinding states and states which ratify after votes
of rejection will be counted at the close of the ratification period.
The conventional assumption is that once a state has ratified a
proposed amendment to the Constitution, that act is irreversible. It is
also believed that a state may reconsider its rejection of an amendment,
and change its vote to the affirmative at any time within the ratification
period set by Congress.4 However, the validity of these assumptions has
never been definitively determined by the Supreme Court. Although the
Court addressed reversal issues in the leading case of Coleman v. Miller,5
the ambiguous language of that decision left the legal status of these
1. Sec. 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate leg-
islation, the provisions of this article.
Sec. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of rati-
fication.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
2. As of April, 1973, 30 of the 38 states necessary had ratified. 1 WOMEN'S RIaiGTS
L. REP., Spring, 1973, at 104.
3. Nebraska has rescinded; Idaho, Tennessee and Kansas are among the states con-
sidering similar action. Letter from J. William Heckman, Counsel, Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to State Senator Shir-
ley Marsh, Nebraska State Senate, Feb. 20, 1973, on file with the Indiana Law Journal
[hereinafter cited as Opinion Letter] ; Letter from Donald E. Knickrehm, Idaho Assist-
ant Attorney General, to Patricia L. McDermott, Member of House of Representatives,
State of Idaho, Jan. 24, 1973, on file with the Indiana Law Journal; Letter from Robert
H. Roberts, Tennessee Assistant Attorney General, to Victor H. Ashe, Tennessee State
Representative, Mar. 13, 1973, on file with the Indiana Law Journal; Letter from Vern
Miller, Kansas Attorney General, to Ruth Luzatti, Member of Kansas House of Repre-
sentatives, Feb. 13, 1973, on file with the Indiana Law Journal.
4. Interview with J. William Heckman, Counsel, Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, by telephone, October 23, 1973;
see letters cited note 3 supra.
5. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Coleman dealt with the question of ratification after pre-
vious rejection. See also Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939). Chandler was a com-
panion case to Coleman which presented the converse situation of withdrawal of ratifi-
cation and was dismissed for lack of a justiciable question.
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assumptions still in doubt.6 Therefore, the effectiveness of reversals by
state legislatures of their earlier actions concerning the Equal Rights
Amendment is uncertain. N
There is a critical need for this uncertainty to be eliminated. Pro-
ponents and opponents of this amendment and future proposed amend-
ments need reliable guides for their lobbying strategies. In addition,
state legislatures which may consider reversing prior resolutions on pro-
posed constitutional amendments should be able to reliably predict the
efficacy of such a course, so that they might avoid possibly futile actions.
The rules by which any proposed amendment is to be ratified must be
reliable and stable. Indeed, article V, which governs the amendment pro-
cess, was designed to ensure such orderly change to the Constitution. It
would be ironic if this article should itself be subject to uncertainty.
This note examines the sources of the ambiguity in the law governing
the ratification process and attempts to suggest avenues toward a much
needed resolution.
SOURCES OF AMBIGUITY
Article V
Article V of the Constitution states in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Consti-
tution . . . which . . . shall be valid to all Intents and Pur-
poses, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Leg-
islatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conven-
tions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress .
Determining the efficacy of a ratification which has been passed after a
vote of rejection, or the efficacy of a ratification which a state is pur-
porting to rescind, requires interpretation of the words "when ratified"
in article V. Three interpretations have been suggested.8 First, under the
Chandler v. Wise theory, the initial action of the state legislature con-
cerning a proposed amendment may be considered conclusive and binding
on future legislatures, even if it is an act of rejection.9 Second, accord-
6. See text accompanying notes 16-19 infra.
7. U.S. Const. art. V.
8. L. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 70-72 (1942) [here-
inafter cited as ORFiELD].
9. 307 U.S. 474 (1939). According to Professor Orfield although treating both
acceptance and rejection as conclusive is logically consistent and would somehow protect
minority rights, this position has received little support. See ORIELD, supra note 8, at 70.
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ing to the "Kansas view," an original vote of rejection may be regarded
as not conclusive, although an original vote of ratification would be."
Third, under the "lottery theory," neither rejection nor ratification may
be considered as final until three-fourths of the states have ratified and
the amendment adopted. Historically, the predominant position has
been that of the "Kansas view."'" However, because the Supreme Court
declared portions of the ratification process to be political questions in
Coleman v. Miller"3 and left the issue to Congress, the continued validity
of this historical position is open to question.
Coleman v. Miller
Coleman involved a challenge to a ratification of the Child Labor
Amendment. 4 The Kansas Supreme Court had upheld the state legisla-
ture's ratification which had been passed over a previous rejection." The
facts in Coleman presented the Supreme Court with the question of
whether a state, having rejected an amendment, could later ratify it.'.
The Court stated:
the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures,
in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal,
should be regarded as a political question.
10. Coleman v. Miller, 146 Kan. 390, 71 P.2d 518 (1937), aff'd on other grounds,
307 U.S. 433 (1939). The argument supporting this theory is that the Constitution cre-
ates only the positive power to ratify. Ratification will therefore exhaust the power
granted, but failure to ratify will leave it intact to be exercised at any time within the
period set by Congress. It follows from this view of the powers under article V that
ratification once given cannot be rescinded. H. Aims, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTioN, H.R. Doc. No. 353, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 299-300 (1897) ; see W.
WnlLoUGHBY, THE CO NSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 329a (1929); J.
JAMESoN, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS §§ 576-84 (1887) [hereinafter
cited as JAmEsoN].
11. The term designating this theory is original. Professor Orfield seems to favor
the position which is based on the argument that ratification should not be more final
than rejection. He states:
[T]here are even stronger practical arguments. It is more democratic to allow
the reversal of prior action. A truer picture of public opinion at the final date
of ratification is obtained. No great confusion is likely to result from such- a
rule ...
ORFIELD, supra note 8, at 72. Orfield does not seem to comprehend the practical difficul-
ties this proposed procedure would entail.
12. See notes 3 & 4 supra. See also text accompanying notes 22-24 infra (discus-
sion of congressional precedent).
13, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
14. H.RJ. Res. 184, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 Stat. 670 (1924).
15. Coleman v. Miller, 146 Kan. 390, 71 P.2d 518, aff'd on other grounds, 307 U.S.
433 (1939).
16. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 447 (1939). Two other questions, not rele-
vant to the subject of this note, were also presented.
17. 307 U.S. at 450. Since Coleumn did not involve the situation presented by a
state's attempt to rescind ratification, it could be argued that attempted withdrawal could
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However, the opinion is confusing and contradictory because it does not
stop there.'" The Court arguably speaks to the merits, citing the tradition-
al congressional pattern of treating ratification, but not rejection, as
binding on a state." It is uncertain from the Court's language whether
it was approving the congressional precedent on legal grounds or whether
it was merely noting its acceptance by the political branches. Despite
this ambiguity, commentators have generally assumed that Coleman is
a political question holding" and that it therefore provides no judicial
precedent for the conventional understanding2' of the meaning of "'when
ratified" in article V. Thus, whatever validity these assumptions may have
is drawn from congressional precedent.
CONGRESSIONAL PRECEDENT
During the ratification process for the fourteenth, fifteenth and
nineteenth amendments, states attempted to reserve both earlier ratifi-
cations and rejections. Yet, there was an almost complete lack of explicit
discussion by Congress of its owIr precedent during the ratification
process for these amendments. Both congressional action and inaction
during these periods are consistent with the view that ratification, but
not rejection, is binding. Further, congressional behavior is not consistent
with the other two possible interpretations of the article V term "when
ratified. 
'-
"
2
During the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Congress was
involved in several steps of the ratification process..2 ' However, the
not properly have been held a political question. But logically, there is no reason to
distinguish between reversal of ratification or ratification over previous rejection. This
logic is supported by the approach of the Coleman Court which dealt with both types of
reversal as if they raised the same legal issue. Id.
18. Dowling, Clarifying the Amending Process, 1 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 215, 219
(1940) [hereinafter cited as Dowling]. N. SMALL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AmERIcA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 799-803 (1964) [hereinafter cited as COR-vlN because it is popularly known by the
name of the original compiler, Edward S. Corwin].
19. 307 U.S. at 450.
20. See Clark, The Supreme Court and the Amending Process, 39 VA. L. REv. 621,
635 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Clark] ; Dowling, supra note 18, at 215; Opinion Letter,
supra note 3.
21. See note 4 supra & text accompanying.
22. See notes 9-11 szpra & text accompanying.
23. This itself may have been a break with precedent. Among the first remarks
which appear in the record concerning the question of adoption is the assertion by
Senator Sumner that "in times past it has been the habit to leave this question to the
Secretary of State, who has made an official certificate on the subject. .... ." CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1868) [hereinafter cited as 40TH CONG.]. Senator Sum-
ner is likely to be dependable on the question of prior practice in this instance as he dis-
agreed with it and was urging the Senate to pass a joint resolution proclaiming the
amendment adopted. His joint resolution was referred to the Judiciary Committee with-
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record yields only one discussion on the question of whether it is within
the power of a state under the Constitution to reverse prior action con-
cerning ratification. The occasion was receipt by the Senate of an Ohio
resolution withdrawing that state's earlier approval of the fourteenth
amendment.2 Among the three senators who spoke, there was no con-
sensus on the permissibility of reversals. The Ohio resolution was
merely referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, in effect killing the
resolution."
With no direction from Congress, when it appeared that flree-
fourths of the states had ratified, the Secretary of State issued a pro-
clamation, certifying:
[I]f the resolutions of the legislatures of Ohio and New Jersey
ratifying the... amendment are to be deemed as remaining of
full force and effect, notvithstanding the subsequent resolu-
tions of the legislatures of those States, which purport to with-
draw the consent of said States . . . then the . . amend-
ment -has been ratified . . . and so has become valid, to all
intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United
States. 6
The next day, without debate, both houses passed a concurrent resolu-
tion declaring that the fourteenth amendment should be promulgated.
The resolution included in the list of ratifying states both those which
had attempted to withdraw ratification (Ohio and New Jersey), as
well as those which had ratified over prior rejection (North Carolina
and South Carolina).2 The Secretary of State then issued the definitive
proclamation declaring the amendment adopted.28
During the ratification period for the fifteenth amendment, the de-
bate was much livelier, due to the fact that the readmitted southern
states were resuming their representation in Congress. Understandably,
the discussions lacked unanimity. More telling was -the final inaction of
Congress. A joint resolution for congressional declaration of the ratifica-
tion of the amendment was referred to, but never re-emerged from, the
Committee on the Judiciary.2" Therefore, there was no formal joint
out comment on its substance by any other Senator, and no action was taken. Id. For
the text of the statute authorizing the Secretary of State to so act see text accompany-
ing note 86 infra.
24. 40TrH CONG., supra note 23, at 876-78.
25. Id. at 878.
26. 15 Stat. 706-07 (1868).
27. 40TH CONG., stupra note 23, at 4266, 4270.
28. 15 Stat. 708-11 (1868).
29. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1444 (1869) [hereinafter cited as 41ST
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congressional action during this entire ratification period.
The Secretary of State, without congressional direction, proclaimed
the amendment ratified."' He noted that while New York had sought
to withdraw its ratification, Georgia had recently ratified. This brought
the number of states to the required three-fourths, regardless of which
way New York was counted. An attempt in the House to have the issue
referred to a special committee failed 1 and, in the end, no action was
taken by Congress to clarify the position of New York. No joint re-
solution was adopted mandating the Secretary to proclaim ratification
as had been done for ratification of the fourteenth amendment. 2 Thus,
the Secretary's proclamation stood notwithstanding the action by New
York, which is now generally considered to be among those states which
ratified the amendment.3
When the nineteenth amendment was ratified, it was simply pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of State, with no question directed to Con-
gress, although both Tennessee which claimed to have rescinded ratifica-
tion and West Virginia which had ratified over prior rejection were
counted among the ratifying states. 4 It seems that the precedent for
ignoring reversals was by then well set since no action of any kind was
proposed or taken in Congress during this ratification period.
Congressional behavior during these three ratification periods has
created precedent consistent only with the theory that ratification is
binding, but rejection is not. 5 Had the Congress espoused the Chandler
v. Wise position, 6 it would have geen necessary to declare invalid the
ratifications of those states which had first rejected the amendment.
Had Congress espoused the lottery theory," it would have been necessary
to honor the attempted withdrawals of ratification.
The Value of Congressional Precedent
Having established the substance of congressional precedent on
ratification, it is necessary to examine its legal import in order to
determine whether legislative precedent can resolve the dilemma for
those who need to know the law governing the ratification process.
CONG.].
30. 16 Stat. 1131-32 (1870).
31. 41sT CONG., .upra note 29, at 2298.
32. See note 27 supra & text accompanying.
33. Opinion Letter, supra note 3, at 4.
34. 41 Stat. 1823 (1920).
35. Chief Justice Hughes reached the same conclusion. Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
36. See note 9 supra & text accompanying.
37. See note 11 'tpra & text accompanying.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
It is understood that no Congress can bind a future Congress. As
Professor Black has put it:
[Based] on the most familiar and fundamental principles, so
obvious as rarely to be stated . . . no Congress has the power
to bind the consciences of its successors, with respect to grave
questions of constitutional law ... "
Precedents ate necessarily less binding than laws since, when change
is sought there is no need for formal repeal. In addition, Congress,
being elected to represent the people at a particular time, is not as
burdened as is the judiciary with the necessity of making its actions
appear consistent. However, Congress is apparently cognizant of its
own precedents when it confronts issues raised only infrequently, and
has accorded them a certain amount of respect in the past. 9
Regard for congressional precedent permeates the response of the
Counsel to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the
Senate Judiciary Committee to an inquiry from the Nebraska State
Senate concerning the permissibility of withdrawing ratification. The
Opinion Letter opened:
Briefly the judicial opinions and, more importantly, the pre-
cedents established by the Congress itself make it clear that
once a state has ratified an amendment, it has exhausted the
only power conferred on it by Article V of the Constitution,
and may not, therefore, validly rescind such action.40
38. Black, Amending the Constitution, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191-92 (1972).
39. The most cogent modern example of this practice is the attempt, led by then
Representative Ford (D.-Mich.), to impeach Supreme Court Associate Justice Douglas.
See House COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 9 1ST CONG., 2D SESS., FNAL FEPORT BY THE SPE-
CIAL SUBCOMM. ON H. REs. 920 (Comm. Print 1970). Despite Representative Ford's as-
sertion "that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Represen-
tatives considers it to be at a given moment in history," id. at 36, the Special Subcommit-
tee took great pains to go back through all past examples of impeachment attempts, to
reconcile apparently conflicting precedents, and to test all the charges against the
parameters they were able to develop, and concluded that their search had "not disclosed
creditable evidence that would warrant preparation of charges on any acceptable concept
of an impeachable offense." Id. at 349.
40. Opinion Letter, supra note 3, at 1. The conclusion is based on the following
argument of Judge Jameson:
The language of the Constitution is, that amendments proposed by Congress, in
the mode prescribed, "shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
states. . . ." By this language is conferred upon the States, by the national
Constitution, a special power; it is not a power belonging to them originally by
virtue of rights reserved or otherwise. When exercised, as contemplated by
the Constitution, by ratifying, it ceases to be a power, and any attempt to ex-
ercise it again must be nullity. But, until so exercised, the power undoubtedly,
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The language in Coleman was then quoted to the effect that Congress is
the final arbitrator of the question of efficacy. 1 The Letter next re-
viewed congressional precedent. Emphasis was placed on the proclama-
tion of the Secretary of State42 during the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment as clearly posing the issue to Congress of the validity of
ratifications which were subsequently rescinded. The congressional
response in that case, as well as its response to the same question during
the ratification period of the fifteenth amendment, were cited as relevant
precedent.4" The Letter concludes with what is currently the most
authoritative statement available on the question of efficacy of ratifica-
tion.
Congress . . . has expressed itself quite definitively on this
question. It is my legal opinion as Counsel of the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments of the United States Senate that
once a State has exercised its only power under Article V of
the United States Constitution and ratified an Amendment
thereto, it has exhausted such power, and that any attempt
subsequently to rescind such ratification is null and void.44
However, since no Congress can bind a subsequent Congress, reversal of
this precedent without prior notice is still a theoretical possibility, if
not a practical probability. Judicial intervention may be necessary to
prevent this occurrence and provide stability in the amendment process.
JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
At the end of the seven-year ratification period, the Congress
which decides which states have effectively ratified the Equal Rights
Amendment will not be the same one which proposed it. It can be
argued that the proposing Congress acted under the dominant assump-
tion that ratification, but not rejection, is final. However, while this
view of efficacy will not be legally binding on the Congress presented
with the question of which state ratifications to honor, citizen lobbyists,
state legislators and even members of Congress have relied on the
continuing validity of this consistent legislative precedent.4" A change
for a reasonable time at least, remains. . . . When ratified all power is ex-
pended. Until ratified the right to ratify remains.
JAMESON, supra note 10, §§ 579-81, at 628-30 (emphasis in original).
41. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
42. See note 26 supra.
43. Opinion Letter, supra note 3, at 4. See note 26 supra & text accompanying.
44. Id.
45. See authorities cited notes 3 & 4 supra.
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in procedure by Congress during -the ratification period would leave
both opponents and proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment in
confusion." If such a change should come when the ratification period
has ended, it could severely prejudice the legitimate expectations of
whichever side ultimately loses.
The courts may well have a role to play in protecting the reliance in-
terests of the citizenry and the states and ensuring that their efforts at or-
derly change are not disrupted by unexpected action on the part of Con-
gress in reversing a longstanding precedent concerning the proper pro-
cedures for ratification. The courts can bring to this precedent the
necessary finality to make it a reliable guide to present and future actions
concerning constitutional amendment. The question arises, however,
whether Coleman v. Miller47 forecloses judicial intervention, or whether
Coleman can be reinterpreted.
There is a constitutional interest in the stability that the courts
could provide. The purpose of the Framers in including article V can
only have been to provide for the orderly alteration of the Constitution
to ensure its responsiveness to future generations. It is anomalous that
a strictly construed political question doctrine might become the instru-
ment for the disorder that would ensue from sudden congressional re-
versal of its own precedent. Such a use would violate the Supreme
Court's articulated purpose for the application of the doctrine, that "a
tool for maintenance of governmental order will not be so applied as to
promote only disorder.", 8
Legal scholars have long recognized the need for finality in the
amendment procedure. One commentator has urged that this goal be
achieved solely through the courts:
[S]ince this is the sort of question which the Supreme Court
has often decided, and since there are no insuperable obstacles
to reaching an accurate decision, the Court should have taken
jurisdiction [in Coleman] and settled . . . the question . . .
and that can only be doie by the Court.49
Another commentator also argued for stability, but believed Coleman
mandated that:
46. Just the possibility of change raises questions of central importance which can-
not be answered. Is it worth the effort to try to get a rejecting state to ratify? Is it
worth the effort to try to get a ratifying state to reverse and attempt to rescind ratifi-
cation? If a state has passed a rescinding resolution, is the original ratification to be
relied on, or should efforts be mounted for re-reversal? How real is the possibility of
change by Congress?
47. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
48. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962).
49. Clark, supra note 20, at 649 (emphasis added).
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The rules must be made by Congress, unless . . . Congress
. . . prefers to leave all questions open for decision if and
whenever they may arise in connection with the ratification of
any given amendment. But surely the law on such a basic
matter as amending the Constitution ought to be known in
advance; and the judicial branch has here passed full respon-
sibility over to the legislative."
While stability must be achieved, neither of the polar views of justici-
ability presented by these commentators will yield the most desirable
solution.
The goal for the courts should be to find the middle ground which
pays respect to the role of Congress, as sanctioned in Coleman, in formu-
lating the rules of ratification, but which at the same time protects the
interests of stability and reliance against the possibilty of congressional
change in the midst of the ratification process.
TOWARD A SPECIAL ARTICLE V DOCTRINE OF JUSTICIABILITY
Any new judicial approach to article V cases must cope with the
holding of Coleman that ratification issues are political questions and
thus reserved exclusively to Congress for decision.5' A re-examination
should be conducted in light of the modern contours of the political ques-
tion doctrine which has been more clearly defined since Coleman. The
current law is derived from Baker v. Carr2 which enumerated the factors
to be considered in determining the presence of a political question:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly
according to the settings in which the questions arise may de-
scribe a political question, although each has one or more
elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separa-
tion of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it ..
50. Dowling, supra note 18, at 220 (emphasis added).
51. See notes 16-19 supra & text accompanying.
52. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
53. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). The following standards, inapplicable here, were
also listed in the opinion:
[T]he impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
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The political question doctrine will only be an obstacle to judicial inter-
vention in the ratification process if the issue can be shown to involve
either a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch of
government or a lack of judicially managable standards.
Textually Demonstrable Commitment
The language in article V" could conceivably give rise to an argu-
ment that the powers under it are textually committed to Congress. How-
ever, in light of recent redefinition of the term, it would appear difficult to
argue that ratification is "textually committed." In Powell v. McCor-
mack"5 the Court held that the statement in article I, section 5 of the
Constitution, "Each House shall be Judge of the . . . Qualifications of
its own Members," was not so complete a textual committment that it
prevented the Court from considering issues concerning the seating or
expulsion of congressmen." The Court indicated that even if it initially
found a textual commitment it would go further and define the scope of
the commitment:
For, as we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, . . "[d]eciding
whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government. . . is itself a
delicate excercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a respon-
sibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Consti-
tution.35
7
To accomplish this the Court was willing to go behind the text to re-
view and analyze the historical context in which the controlling phrase
was adopted in order to determine the intent of the Framers.58  The
Court's approach in Powell made clear that the notion "textual com-
mitment" is far from absolute.
In order to examine to what extent the ratification process has been
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from mul-
tifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
54. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
55. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
56. Id. at 550. Professor Wechsler had listed article 1, § 5 among the few explicit
textual commitments in the Constitution. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. RFv. 1, 8 (1959). The text of article 1, § 5 seems much
more of a commitment to Congress than the expression "when ratified" from article V
which would need to be interpreted in any redetermination of whether ratification is a
political question.
57. 395 U.S. at 521.
58. Id. at 521-48.
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textually committed to Congress, it is necessary to determine the meaning
of the phrase "when ratified" by looking to the historical background
of article V. During the drafting of the article the most controversial
portion was the role Congress would play in proposing amendments. 9
In order to balance that role, the states were given particular prominence
in the ratification process."
In view of this concern, there would seem to be no reason to con-
clude that the Framers intended article V to be within the exclusive
control of Congress. No historical reasons appears to exclude the Court
from its traditional role of interpretating the Constitution. The Court
should be able to determine if the states have followed the correct amend-
ing procedure, whether this requires an intrepretation of article V or of
congressional statute or precedent.
Judicially Manageable Standards
Just as a textual commitment would indicate the presence of a
political question, so also would the finding that there is a lack of judicial-
ly manageable standards.6 Although the Supreme Court encountered
little difficulty in determining judicially manageable standards for con-
stitutional interpretation in Powell v. McCormack, 2 it seems unlikely
that the Court meant to foreclose all future inquiry in constitutional cases
into whether judicially manageable standards are available. Should the
Court seek a source of standards for article V cases, it would find two
possibilities which would not require overruling Colenwn:63 (1) an
article V doctrine which would evolve a special theory of limited just-
iciability confining the Court's role in ratification cases to assuring that
congressional precedent is not altered in the midst of the amendment
process; and (2) a statutory construction theory which Would limit the
Court's intervention to interpretation of the statute which implements
59. OpxiELD, supra note 8, at 2.
60. Id. at 61. Likewise, Clark states:
In view of the apprehension of the writers of the Constitution caused by giving
Congress power to propose amendments, [1 FARRAND, RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 202-203 (1911) ; 2 id. at 629-31] the holding of the Cole-
a n case provides an interesting example of the change both in outlook and
method of government which has occurred since 1789.
Clark, supra note 20, at 651.
61. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
62. 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
63. Overruling Coleman would be unnecessary because the portion of the opinion
which found it impossible to fashion judicially manageable standards related solely to the
question of the lapse of time since the proposal of the amendment. Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 453 (1939). The absence of standards was not one of the factors which
led the Court to conclude that efficacy of ratification was a political question.
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article V.64 Either of these sourses would permit the 'courts to provide
stability to the ratification process while at the same time giving-Con-
gress a determinative role in formulating the rules for rittificatidn."5
(1) Article V Doctrine
The adoption of this doctrine, which would give the courts a limited
role in interpreting article V, would require reinterpreting that portion
of Coleman which dealt with ratification.66 Instead of being a p'ure politi-
cal question holding, the case may have evidenced the continuation of an
implicit doctrine followed by the Court in article V cases. Although
Chief justice Hughes in his opinion for the Court stated that "'the ques-
tion of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures. . . should be
regarded as a political question,"67 he reviewed congressional action
during the ratification of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments and then, arguably, came to an actual decision on the merits.
Thus the political departments of the Government dealt
with the effect both of previous rejection and of attempted
withdrawal and determined that both were ineffectual.
This decision by the political departments of the Government
. . . has been accepted."
64. That statute is codified at 1 U.S.C. § 106b (1970).
65. A third possible source of standards would be an independent constitutional
construction theory. This theory is not advocated, however, because it would not protect
reliance interests. The Court has stated that it does not consider itself bound by the
constitutional interpretations of a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 549 (1969). Therefore, a court would be free to ignore congressional precedent and
adopt any of the three possible interpretations of the article V phrase "when ratified."
See notes 9-11 supra & text accompanying. Another objection to the theory is that it
would threaten the separation of powers policies embodied in the political question doc-
trine. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
66. It is the language of Chief Justice Hughes, writing the opinion of the Court,
that is capable of reinterpretation. It was not a majority opinion, however, and votes of
those who joined in Justice Black's concurring opinion were necessary to reach the re-
suit. The concurrence is much more dearly a pure political question holding and there-
fore not capable of such reinterpretation. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456-60
(1939) (concurring opinion).
67. Id. at 450.
68. Id. The Court then stated:
The precise question as now raised is whether, when the legislature of the
State, as we have found, has actually ratified the proposed amendment, the
Court should restrain the state officers from certifying the ratification to the
Secretary of State, because of an earlier rejection, and thus prevent the question
from coming before the political departments. We find no basis in either Con-
stitution or statute for such judicial action. Article V, speaking solely of' rati-
fication, contains no provision as to rejection. Nor has the Congress enadted
a statute relating to rejections ..
The statute [now codified at 1 U.S.C. § 106b (1970)] presupposes official'
notice to the Secretary of State when a state legislature has adopted a resolution
of ratification. We see no warrant for judicial interference with the perform-
ance of that duty.
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The conclusion that a historic precedent "has been accepted" seems
inconsistent with a political question holding, as was pointed out in the
concurring opinion of four of the justices:
To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even
impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the
exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission
and ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree ...
The Court here treats the amending process of the Consti-
tution in some respects as subjects to judicial construction, in
others as subject to the final authority of the Congress.
Further, it seems unlikely that the Court intended a pure political question
holding since it cited several prior Court decisions concerning article V
in such a way as to indicate their continuing validity.7"
The Coleman decision, if interpreted as a pure political question
holding, must be understood to have reversed a clear trend in which article
V questions had been considered uniformly justiciable.' In the decade
of the Twenties, a great flurry of judicial activity centered around the
eighteenth amendment (Prohibition), the nineteenth amendment
(Women's Suffrage), and the proposed Child Labor Amendment. Chal-
lenges -to both the content of the amendments, as well as the procedures
by which they had been proposed and ratified, were decided arguably on
the merits. These decisions were sufficient to construe the following
italicized portions of article V which constitute virtually all of the sig-
nificant portions of that article:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitu-
tion, . . . which. . . shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
Id. at 450-51. Again, the opinion seems to say too much to be completely consistent with
a political question holding. The statement could be read to construe both the statute,
and article V itself as having nothing to do with rejections. This would provide further
support for the argument that the Coleman holding, as to efficacy of ratification, should
be reexamined and reinterpreted to yield a special article V doctrine.
69. Id. at 458.
70. The Court's opinion included references to: Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130
(1922) ; Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920);
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
71. CORWIN, supra note 18, at 802; Dowling, supra note 18, at 215; Clark, su pra note
20, at 646. Prior to Coleman, the only exception to the presumption of justiciability
seems to be Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39 (1849) where the validity of
adoption of an amendment is alluded to in dicta as a political quetsion. In an even
earlier case, Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), questions as to the
legality of an amendment has been assumed to be justiciable and the Court ruled on the
merits concerning a step in the process of proposal.
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as Part of this Constitition, when ratified by the Legislatures
of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may
be proposed by the Congress; .... 72
Hawke v. Smith7 ' held that a provision in a state constitution al-
lowing legislation to be approved by referendum was inapplicable to
ratification of a constitutional amendment because ratification is not a
regular legislative act. 4 In reaching this decision, the Court construed
the word "Legislatures" as it appears in article V.7' This was the first
time language within the article was construed by the Court. The holding
necessarily implied that the choice of the "Mode of Ratification" could
not be altered by state action.
The National Prohibition Cases"6 also provided an example of the
Court's construction of language in article V. These cases established
the principle that "two thirds of both Houses" could be interpreted in
terms of congressional quorums rather than the total membership of each
house for the purpose of determining whether a proposed amendment was
"deem[ed]. . . necessary."7' These cases also defined "Amendments'
to include additions to, rather than merely changes in, matters already
included in the Constitution.7 These two portions of article V seem far
more explicitly committed to congressional power by the Constitution
than is the phrase "when ratified," the phrase which must be construed to
ascertain the efficacy of ratifications.
In Dillon v. Gloss,7 0 the Supreme Court held that the adoption
of the eighteenth amendment was completed as of the date of ratification
by the last state required, rather than as of the date of promulgation by
the Secretary of State.8" In so doing the Court necessarily construed the
clause "which shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes as Part of this
Constitution." -
These cases can be interpreted in several ways. First, they can be
72. U.S. Const. art. V (emphasis added).
73. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
74. Id. at 228.
75. Id. at 227.
76. 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
77. See id. at 386.
78. Id.
79. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
80. The Court's determination resulted in affirming the denial of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus by a defendant who had been convicted of transporting intoxicat-
ing liquor. If, as he had argued, the effectiveness of the amendment depended on the
date of promulgation, the amendment would not have been in effect at the time of his
arrest. Id. at 370, 376.
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understood as decisions on the merits concerning the meaning of the words
of article V which the Court arrived at independent of congressional
precedent. This would give the predominant role to the judicial branch
in the construction of the article. Second, the cases could be construed
as not involving the merits but meaning only that the congressional in-
terpretations were within legislative powers under article V, thus giving
the primary role to Congress. Or they may be understood in a third
way which yields a cooperative role for the Court and the Congress. This
last approach, which shall be called the article V doctrine, views the Court
as adopting on the merits past congressional interpretations of article V
as definitive constructions of the Constitution.
This third interpretation is the best supported by the evidence. The
Court in the article V cases has never contravened a practice adopted by
Congress.8 This is too great a coincidence to be consistent with independ-
ent judicial constitutional construction. In addition, none of the pre-
Coleman article V cases, although not overruled by Coleman,2 appear on
their face to be political question holdings consistent with the second
approach above. Finally, language in Coleman itself goes beyond a pure
political question holding and is indicative of acceptance of congressional
precedent."3 Chief Justice Hughes' statement that historic congressional
precedent "has been accepted," 4 was interpreted by Professor Dowling
to support this assertion:
The result of it all seems to be: . . . that the Court con-
siders the law already settled by "historic precedent" to the
effect that a state can change its vote from No to Yes (the same
precedent refused a change from Yes to No) ...
[This] itself involves something akin to a decision on the
merits. That is to say, when the Court declared that the historic
precedent of the Fourteenth Amendment "has been accepted" it
was in that very declaration making a pronouncement on the
law . . .85
Coleman, viewed as an acceptance of, rather than a deference to, con-
gressional precedent is consistent with the article V doctrine advanced
here as a source of judicially manageable standards. Under this doctrine,
once a challenge to an amendment procedure is brought before a court, it
81. ORFiELD, supra note 8, at 13 n.12.
82. See note 70 supra & text accompanying.
83. Coleman v. Miller, 301 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
84. Id.
85. Dowling, supra note 18, at 219.
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will draw the logic for its constitutional interpretation from applicable
congressional precedent and declare it henceforth to be the law. The con-
gressional interpretation will thus be endowed with the necessary finality
to be a reliable guide to those interested in amending the Constitution,
whether they be individual citizens, state legislators or members of Con-
gress itself.
The policies underlying a political question holding are in no way
contravened by this doctrine. The role of the legislative branch is preserved
by allowing it to interpret article V in the first instance. If congressional
precedent on the issue is nonexistent, or should the Court not wish to
lock Congress into an interpretation once utilized, it could make clear, as
part of the special article V doctrine, that its interpretation will be law
only so long as Congress does not pass a prospective general statute
changing the amendment rules. Even this lesser role for the Court would
protect reliance and stability by preventing congressional change without
notice. While the course of judicial action suggested may seem un-
orthodox, it takes into consideration both the legitimacy of congressional
flexibility in the amendment process and at the same time forecloses the
possibility of congressional change without warning.
(2) Statutory Construction
As an alternative to applying the article V doctrine as the standard by
which to decide ratification questions, the courts could adopt the method
of statutory construction, a more conservative source of judicially
manageable standards. The only statute concerning the amendment process
ever passed by Congress provided as follows:
Whenever official notice is received at the Department of State
that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United
States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Con-
stitution, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause the amend-
ment to be published, with his certificate, specifying the States
by which the same may have been adopted, and that the same
has become valid, to all intents and purposes as part of the Con-
stitution of the United States."
As with congressional precedent itself, this statute is consistent only with
the theory that rejection can be reversed, but ratification cannot.
86. Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 80, § 2, 3 Stat. 439. The statute was amended in
1951, but the only change was to substitute "General Services Administration" for "De-
partment of State" and "Administrator of General Service" for "Secretary of State."
Act of October 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 2(b), 65 Stat. 710, amending 5 U.S.C. § 160 (1940)(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 106b (1970)).
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The statute gives the Secretary of State (now the Administrator of
General Services)"7 authority to act only when an amendment has been
adopted. The Secretary's duty is an accounting and publication function
with no discretion involved. His power is limited to counting ratifications
as they are received from the states and announcing when the required
proportion of the states have ratified. There is no provision in the statute
for notification of a state's failure to ratify, nor is there any provision
for rescinding a notification of ratification after it has been filed with the
Secretary. Only once has a Secretary of State sought clarification of
whether the ratification of a state attempting to rescind was still in force.88
Congress responded in the affirmative."9 By the time of the nineteenth
amendment the precedent of ignoring reversals was so well established
that the Secretary failed even to mention them in his promulgation."0
Historic conduct under the statute is consistent solely with the theory
which makes both prior rejection and attempted withdrawal null and void,
a theory for which it is unnecessary to judge the efficacy of ratifications
once official notice has been received.
The pre-Coleman article V case of Leser v. Garnett" in which the
Court interpreted the promulgation statute is consistent with this theory.
In Leser, the nineteenth amendment was challenged on the ground that
it was not ratified by the requisite number of states. Tennessee had voted
to rescind earlier ratification. West Virginia's ratification was over prior
rejection. Both questions concerning the efficacy of ratification were
thus squarely presented to the Supreme Court in Leser. Justice Brandeis,
for a unanimous Court, noted that the questions could be avoided on the
ground that two additional states had since ratified the amendment, which
arguably made the questions moot.
Nevertheless the opinion declared:
But a broader answer should be given to the contention. The
proclamation by the Secretary certified that. . . the proposed
Amendment was ratified by the legislatures of thirty-six states,
and that it "has become valid to all intents and purposes as a
part of the Constitution of the United States. . . ." As the
legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had power to a-
dopt the resolutions of ratification, official notice to the Secre-
tary, duly authenticated, that they had done so, was conclusive
87. See note 86 supra.
88. 15 Stat. 706-07 (1868) (during ratification of the fourteenth amendment).
89. 40THa CONG., supra note 23, at 4266, 4270.
90. 41 Stat. 1823 (1920).
91. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
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upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is con-
clusive upon the courts. 2
Thus the Secretary's duty to issue a proclamation of adoption, upon re-
ceipt of the requisite number of ratifications, without attempting in any
way to judge their merit, was made even clearer. Like congressional pre-
cedent itself, the statute evidences only one meaning of the article V'words
"when ratified." A court could rely on Leser3 and interpret this statute
as the congressional decision on the law of ratification which may be
held binding until repealed or amended.
The statutory construction approach, like the article V doctrine,
would yield judicially manageable standards for determining the law
of ratification. Should the courts follow tis approach a certain amount
of finality would be given to the ratification process upon which con-
cerned citizens and legislatures might rely. At the same time, congres-
sional participation in the process would be recognized. While the law of
ratification could still conceivably be changed in the midst of a ratifica-
tion period by repeal or amendment of the applicable statute, the neces-
sity of formal action by Congress would make the likelihood of reversal
of precedent less than if Congress were to remain free to accept or
reject state ratifications. Statutory construction would provide greater
protection for the interests of reliance and stability than if the courts were
to follow a strict political question doctrine, although less than if the
courts were to adopt the suggested article V doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The common assumption that ratification of a constitutional amend-
ment is irreversible, but rejection is not, is an open legal question. With
ratifications of the Equal Rights Amendment nearing the number required
for adoption, there is a crucial need for an authoritative construction of the
article V phrase "when ratified." Despite the traditional belief that
92. Id. at 137.
93. The precedential value of Leser may be questioned in light of Coleman v. Mil-
ler, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). The commentators are divided as to Coleman's effect on prior
article V cases. See Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention:
Some Problems, 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 659 (1964) ; Dowling, supra note 18, at 220.
Nevertheless, Coleman cited Leser for the following proposition:
The statute [now 1 U.S.C. § 106b (1970)] presupposes official notice to the
Secretary of State when a state legislature has adopted a resolution of ratifica-
tion. We see no warrant for judicial interference with the performance of that
duty.
307 U.S. at 451. Thus, it was clear that Leser was not overruled since it was cited as
authority for at least a portion of the holding.
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Coleman v. Miller,94 as a pure political question holding, precluded Court
involvement in the amendment process, there is room for both Court and
Congress in interpreting article V. The role of each would be pre-
served by the Court's adopting either the article V doctrine or the
statutory construction theory suggested here. There is no need for the
Court to substitute its judgment for that of Congress. Congressional
intent is abundantly clear from its own precedent and from the promul-
gation statute. Either approach would serve the paramount purposes of
reliance and stability. Moreover, none of the underlying policy consid-
erations of the political question doctrine would be contravened.
Either approach would yield a firm interpretation that the meaning
of "when ratified" in article V allows states to reverse rejection and later
ratify, but not to rescind ratification.
LYNN ANDRETTA FIsHEL
94. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
